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Abstract
This study examines the e¤ect of electoral strength on politicians trade policy prefer-
ences using data of candidates running for the members of the House of Representatives
in Japan. The results reveal that the electoral strength measured by the margin of vote
a¤ects candidatestrade policy preferences after controlling attributes of candidates and
constituencies. Specically, candidates who face a close race in election are more likely
to be protectionist than those who are expected to be elected by a substantial majority,
suggesting that electoral competitions deter politicians from supporting trade liberal-
ization. This result is robust to the model with the margin of vote as an endogenous
variable.
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1. Introduction
Although economists have shown the benets of free trade in terms of economic welfare,
protectionist trade policies, such as imposing high tari¤s, may be given priority over free
trade policy. Clarifying a factor that deters a politician from supporting free trade policy has
been a central issue in international economics. Previous empirical studies on determinants
of congressional voting patterns on trade policy have focused on the role of economic vari-
ables such as skill endowment and industry composition in his/her constituencies to examine
the theoretical predictions by trade theories1 and that of campaign contributions based on
political economy.2 On the other hand, a recent study reports that in addition to economic
variables, electoral factors a¤ect legislatorsvotes on trade policy. A politician may change
a favorable policy when inuenced by re-election incentive. Using micro data of candidates
running for the members of the House of Representatives in Japan, this study empirically
examines the e¤ect of electoral strength on politicianstrade policy preferences.
Empirical evidence on the inuence of electoral incentives or pressures on trade policy
preferences are initially observed by Conconi et al. (2014), who examine the determinants of
votes on trade policy using the results of votes on major bills related with trade liberalization
since the 1970s in the U.S. Congress. They show that senators are more likely to support free
1For example, Magee (1980) and Irwin (1994) examine the correlation between votes for trade bills by
congressional representatives and industry characteristics of their constituencies but do not consider skill
endowment factors. Similarly, Kaempfer and Marks (1993), Baldwin and Magee (2000), and Beaulieu (2002)
examine the determinants of votes for trade liberalization bills by members of the congress, introducing both
skill endowment and industry variables in their representative districts. Mostly, these studies report that
both skill endowment and industry characteristics of legislators constituency are correlated with votes on
trade policy bills.
2Grossman and Helpman (1994) theoretically explain that the introduction of a trade restriction policy
is determined by the contributions of lobbying groups. Baldwin and Magee (2000) and Devault (2010)
report that campaign contributions a¤ected legislatorsvotes on free trade agreements in the U.S. House of
Representatives.
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trade policy than house representatives, except for those who are serving their nal term,
suggesting that re-electoral incentives deter legislators from supporting free trade policies. For
politicians, election pressure is possibly a source of protectionism. Although Conconi et al.
(2014) rst attempted to show that electoral pressures drive politicians toward protectionism,
there are some studies that examine the relation between electoral competition and political
stance in general policies. For example, Lee et al. (2004) empirically examine the causal
issue as to whether voters a¤ect candidates policy preferences or merely select existing
policies using various voting score data in the U.S. Congress during 19461995. In the
former causal relation, candidates who are elected with a large majority are likely to select
more partisan policies, whereas electoral competition leads candidates to select policies that
are more moderate.
In the context of trade liberalization versus protectionist trade policy, politicians who face
close races in elections are expected to advocate protectionist trade policies that maintain
the status quo (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). On the other hand, the latter causal relation
implies that candidates adopt policies based solely on their political beliefs, and therefore, the
strength of their election performances has no relation with trade policy preferences. These
contrasting predictions have been a controversial issue in the elds of political economy and
political science. For general policy positions, the latter prediction is supported by Lee et
al. (2004) for the U.S. representatives and Albouy (2011) for the U.S. senators.3 However,
in the context of determinants of protectionism, no study has yet attempted to examine the
relation between electoral strength and political stance of trade policy. Although Conconi
et al. (2014) focus on the proximity of the election, even if the election is near, candidates
3As a measurement of representativespolicy positions, they use Americans for Democratic Action score.
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policy preferences may di¤er depending on their electoral strength. In this respect, the
present study sheds light on the heterogeneity of electoral pressures among candidates and
examines the e¤ects of electoral strength on trade policy preferences using data collected
from electoral candidates.
In the empirical analysis, I use the bivariate probit model to determine the probability of
supporting a protectionist trade policy and nonparticipation in the Trans-Pacic Partnership
(TPP). The results show that electoral strength, as measured by the margin of votes received
in the election, is strongly associated with politicianstrade policy preferences. More specif-
ically, winners in an election by a narrow margin are more likely to support a protectionist
trade policy compared with winners by huge majorities, ceteris paribus. This result suggests
that there is a possibility that electoral pressures deter politicians from supporting free trade
policy. In addition, this nding is robust to control the potential endogeneity of electoral
strength using an indicator of hereditary candidates as an instrument.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a hypothesis to
be tested and describes data on trade policy preferences. Section 3 presents a structural
equation model to explain the probability of selecting trade policy preferences and explana-
tory variables with an instrumental variable. Section 4 presents the estimation results of the
structural model. Section 5 concludes the study.
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2. Electoral strength and trade policy preferences
2.1. Hypothesis on electoral strength and its measurement
How the level of electoral strength leads politicians to support protectionist trade policies is
an interesting issue. Conconi et al. (2014) focus on the di¤erence in generations of senators
and nd that the oldest generations who face elections are likely to support protectionist
trade policies. However, even if the election is near, policy preferences may di¤er between
candidates who are expected to win election and those who are not. This study sheds light
on the heterogeneity of electoral pressures among candidates.
A theoretical conjecture on the relation between electoral competition and protectionism
is related with the discussion on policy convergence vs. policy divergence. As presented by
the median voter theorem, electoral competitions cause policy convergence among politicians
under certain conditions. However, there is also a view that the opposite is true when
politicians can simply implement their preferred policy. In this case, voters cannot a¤ect
politicianspolicy preferences; this results in policy divergence (Alesina, 1988).
Based on data of the U.S. Congress, recent empirical studies attempt to uncover the
contrastive relation as to whether voters a¤ect candidatespolicy preferences or merely select
existing policies (Lee et al., 2004; Albouy, 2011). Although these studies focus on the general
voting behavior that covers broad policies, little is known about preferences of trade policy
as a specic policy. This study follows the assumption of Lee et al. (2004) that candidates
who are elected with a large majority select more partisan policies, whereas those with
weak electoral support select policies that are more moderate. In the context of trade policy,
politicians who face close races in elections are expected to more likely advocate protectionism
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because protectionist trade policies are considered as a moderate way in the sense of the status
quo, whereas free trade policy is likely to be a partisan way because it leads to structural
changes. In this respect, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) theoretically show that there is a
status quo bias in formulating structural reform (i.e., trade liberalization) whenever individual
gainers and losers from the reform cannot be identied ex ante, and this tendency holds even
if economic welfare is expected to increase ex post as a whole. Therefore, the hypothesis to
be tested is as follows:
H: Candidates who face close race in elections are more likely to support protectionist
trade policies than those who win elections by a large majority.
In this study, the electoral strength is measured based on the number of votes gained in
the election.4 Assuming that all candidates estimate the number of possible votes they will
obtain in the election with high accuracy based on opinion polls in the election campaign,
the di¤erence in actual votes over competitors can be considered as a proxy for the level
of electoral strength. Specically, I construct a victory margin or loss; for winners, margin
is dened as the share of the obtained vote over the vote of the second-placed candidates,
whereas for those placed second and thereafter, it is dened as the share of the obtained vote
over the vote of the rst-placed candidate.
2.2. Data for trade policy preferences
This study uses data for politicianstrade policy preferences retrieved from the University
of Tokyo-Asahi Survey (UTAS).5 The survey has collected data on preferences of various
4The results of votes are available on the website of the Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications.
5UTAS is conducted by Masaki Taniguchi of the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, University of
Tokyo and the Asahi Shimbun.
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policies, including trade policies from candidates running for the Diet. The results of the
survey are released promptly before the election date by the Asahi Shimbun, which is one of
Japans major daily newspapers, for voters to di¤erentiate the policy preferences of candidates
running for election.6 This study focuses on the election of the members of the House of
Representatives in December 2012, which covers the data on 1,294 candidates in a single-seat
constituency.7
The survey comprised two questions about trade policy preferences. One is a general ques-
tion about trade liberalization: Which policy do you support: (a) trade liberalization and/or
(b) protection of domestic industries?The answers (with the distribution of responses in
parentheses) are as follows: For (a), support(11.7%), somewhat support(15.3%), and
not sure(22.6%). Likewise, for (b), support(23.5%), somewhat support(22.0%), and
not answered (4.9%). Another question regards the TPP as a specic EPA, which is the
subject of ongoing negotiations and one of the important issues in the election: Answer
what you think about the opinion as follows: We should participate in the membership of
the TPP.The distribution of responses is as follows: agree(15.9 %), somewhat agree
(12.6 %), not sure(14.6 %), somewhat disagree(9.2 %), strongly disagree(43.6 %),
and not answered (4.1 %). As seen in the distribution, a majority of candidates support
protectionist trade policy. This is contrastive to the trade policy preferences of the general
6In Japanese parliament, the principle of one party for one personis common. Therefore, no variations
exist in voting behavior among members who belong to the same party. This survey is the only way to know
their political stances.
7The survey was conducted for 1,504 candidates from November 16 to December 16 just before the
election counting date, and there were 1,404 valid respondents. Of these, 1,294 candidates ran in single-seat
constituencies. In the election, 480 seats were lled, of which 300 were for single-seat districts and 180 were
elected by the proportional representation system. Candidates who belong to a political party are allowed
to run for the election in both single-seat constituency and a proportional representation district. The seat
allocation of a proportional representation system uses the DHondt formula, and in the case of the same
order, the candidate who is high in loss margin in the single-seat constituency is elected.
7
population. A recent academic survey on trade policy preferences at the individual level in
Japan showed that approximately 51% favor further liberalization and 32% object to it (Ito
et al., 2015). In addition, major opinion polls suggest that more than half of the nationals
support participation in the TPP. This contrasting result from the individuals viewpoint
raises the question of why politicians are unwilling to support trade liberalization.
Table 1 shows the distribution of respondentsanswers to the abovementioned two ques-
tions. Interestingly, there are politicians who have a view that trade liberalization is agreeable
while dissenting on specic trade agreement, and vice versa. It is interesting to see di¤erence
in the e¤ects of electoral strength on choosing the trade policy preferences between the two
questions. An econometric issue is that the two choices are determined simultaneously, and
therefore, there is a concern about the endogeneity problem in the sense that the error terms
of the two equations in terms of trade policy preferences for the two responses are correlated
with each other. To deal with the problem, this study estimates the probability of making
two choices using the bivariate probit model. Applying this method enables the identication
of possible di¤erent e¤ects of explanatory variables on the trade policy preferences depending
on the two questions.
<Table 1 around here>
3. Empirical strategy and control variables
3.1. Bivariate probit model with endogenous variable
Following the literature on this topic, the model is specied based on a binary choice model.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, there are two questions about trade policy preferences, and
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therefore two binary variables are constructed. One is derived from the responses to the gen-
eral question about trade liberalization and the other is drawn by analyzing results from the
question about the TPP as a specic regional trade agreement. The two outcome variables,
yij1 and yij2 are expressed as follows:
yij1 =

1 : Protectionist if yij1 > 0





1 : Anti-TPP if yij2 > 0
0 : Pro-TPP if yij2  0

(2)
where su¢ x i denotes the candidate, and j denotes the constituency. yij1 and y

ij2 are latent
variables dened as an observable binary variable that equals 1 if candidate i who runs from
constituency j supports a protectionist trade policy, and 0 otherwise. Each latent variable is
assumed to be linearly related with electoral strength zi and a set of exogenous covariates x
explained in the section as follows.
A key empirical issue is that the electoral strength measured by the victory or loss margin
of vote is suspected to be an endogenous variable as the number of votes gained is an outcome
of the election.8 To deal with the endogeneity problem, this study employs a bivariate probit
with an endogenous variable model. Similar to standard instrumental variables estimation,
introducing additional instrumental variables that have explanatory power for the endogenous
variable but do not a¤ect the outcome variable is necessary. As an instrument, I adopt a
8In considering the causality issue, one may think that using the number of votes of the last election is
appropriate, but in that case, it sacrices the sample of newcomers, who comprise 61% of the total sample.
Furthermore, because Japan underwent a regime change in the 2009 election from the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and in the 2012 election from the DPJ to the LDP,
the change of seats has been drastic, and the number of votes obtained in the previous election does not
necessarily reect the pressure of the current election in a precise manner.
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dummy variable indicating hereditary candidates (i.e., hereditary). In Japan, it is common
knowledge that second-generation candidates have an advantage over their competitors in
election campaigns because of their succession of a support base, name recognition, and an
election campaign fund-raising from their relatives and supporters of the rst generation. In
addition, the dummy for hereditary candidates is believed to be irrelevant to trade policy
preferences. In this study, hereditary candidates are dened as candidates whose relative
within the third degree of relation was a Diet member (including an experienced member),
in succession to the entire electoral district or some part of the district, or candidates whose
parents were Diet members even if they do not succeed to the district. According to the
denition, 11% (140 people) were hereditary candidates (1,294 people) who ran from single
seat constituencies, and 80% (112 people) of those were elected.
In the empirical specication, the dummy for hereditary candidates is hi, which is likely
to a¤ect the electoral strength, zi but neither yi1 nor y

i2. To sum up, these relations are
formed as the equations as follows:
yi1 = x
0
ij+zi + ui + i1 (3)
yi2 = x
0
ij + zi + ui + i2 (4)
zi = x
0
i + hi + !ui + i3 (5)
where x
0
i is a set of covariates explained in the section below, and  and  are vectors
of coe¢ cients. The continuous and endogenous variable zi is a¤ected by an unobserved
component, ui that also inuences the two binary outcome variables. The error terms and
10
unobserved component are assumed to be distributed as the standard normal distribution.
These equations are estimated using a general structural model, which ts generalized linear
models with latent variables by maximum likelihood estimation.9
3.2. Candidates attributes
The UTAS compiles candidatesbasic characteristics, such as gender and age. In the es-
timation, e¤ects of both age and gender are controlled. In addition, the data on political
characteristics is available in the survey. The term for which a candidate was elected as a
member of the House of Representatives may be correlated with his/her trade policy prefer-
ences if the extent of experience as a member strengthens his/her inuence on making policy.
As a measurement of experience, the survey provides information on candidatescareers as
follows: newcomer, experienced, former member, or incumbent. To control a hysteresis ef-
fect on trade policy preferences, dummy variables for career as a member of the House of
Representatives (experienced, former, and incumbent) and the terms (terms) are added into
the right-hand side of the model. The a¢ liation of a political party is likely to a¤ect their
policy preferences strongly. In the case of the U.S. Congress, Democrats tend to be more
protectionist than Republicans, as shown by Conconi et al. (2014). In Japan, there are many
political parties, as illustrated in Table 4, which displays the distribution of candidatestrade
policy preferences by political party. Obviously, their policy preferences di¤er according to
party a¢ liation, and this suggests that party dummy variables would be strongly signicant.
Di¤erences in the policy interests of candidates may be correlated with their trade policy
9Since the likelihood includes the integral of latent variables, the model does not have a closed-form
solution. I apply the GaussHermite quadrature approximation to the likelihood.
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preferences. In Japans political system, the members of the House of Representatives who
have focused on a specic policy for many years are said to have a strong inuence on
the policy. In this respect, the survey comprised the question about particular areas of
engagement as follows: Which is the eld of policy that you have made e¤orts until now?
Regarding trade policies, because agriculture is the most sensitive and import-competing
sector in Japan, candidates who engaged in agricultural policy as their eld of expertise were
likely to support import restriction to protect the sector and maintain their political inuence.
From answers to this question, I dened the dummy variable for inuential members on
agricultural policy (inuence) with a value of 1 if a candidate selected policy for agriculture,
forestry, and sheries,and 0 otherwise. A di¤erence in campaign style may a¤ect their trade
policy preferences. A candidate who appeals to organizations from which many votes can
be expected may conform to their needs. In the survey, a question regarding campaign style
is as follows: For an election campaign, various activities are allowed, except appealing for
a policy. During this election, which is the element you make the most of (except appealing
for a policy)? To control the di¤erence in the style of election campaigns, I introduce
the dummy variable (organized) into the model that takes a value of 1 for a candidate
who selected to appeal to specic people or organizations, and 0 otherwise.10 Because it is
believed that a candidate intending an organized election campaign has a strong tendency
toward protectionism, the dummy variable is expected to have a positive sign. With regard to
TPP participation, the TPP is generally believed to be approximately equivalent to the FTA
with the U.S. because the majority of trade volumes within member countries are a result
10The choices are prepared as follows: (1) to appeal to specic people or organizations who or that have
always supported you, (2) to emphasize past achievements, (3) to emphasize ability for government leadership,
(4) to emphasize the nature of the leader, and (5) to emphasize your own achievements and nature.
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of trade between the U.S. and Japan.11 Therefore, negotiations with the U.S. play a major
role in obtaining a conclusion. There is a concern that the anti-U.S. feeling of politicians
may deter them from supporting Japans participation in the TPP. The survey comprised the
question as follows: Do you have friendly feelings toward the U.S.?To control the e¤ect of
sentiment toward the U.S., the anti-U.S. feeling dummy (sentiment) is included in the model
that takes a value of 1 for a candidate who answered Noto this question, and 0 otherwise.
3.3. Constituencys attributes
Characteristics at the constituency level are expected to a¤ect candidates policy prefer-
ences.12 First, as reported by previous studies (Kaempfer and Marks, 1993; Baldwin and
Magee, 2000; Beaulieu, 2002), both skill endowment and industry variables in their con-
stituencies are employed as explanatory variables based on ideas from trade theories. If
workers cannot move across industries, as assumed by the RicardoViner model, industry
composition is expected to be correlated with candidates trade policy preferences. Can-
didates who run for the election in constituencies with a high share of workers in import-
competing industries are likely to oppose trade liberalization. On the other hand, a large
share of workers in export industries may lead candidates to support free trade policies. In
this analysis, the share of agricultural workers (agri) and that of manufacturing workers
(manuf ) are added into the model as a proxy for the share of workers of import-competing
11According to trade volume statistics in 2013, the U.S. is Japans largest export destination and the second
largest origin of imports. The share of trade with the U.S. is 26.9% of Japans total trade volume.
12There is no o¢ cial statistics at the constituency level. Therefore, I construct by aggregating data of the
national census disaggregated into the cyocyolevel, which is the smallest unit of address under municipality
(like a streetlevel) in 2010.
13
industries and that of export industries, respectively.13 In addition, the presence of high-
skilled individuals in constituencies is likely to be correlated with their preferences if workers
are mobile between industries, as presented in the StolperSamuelson theorem. To examine
this, the populations share of high-skilled individuals, dened as graduates from college or
graduate school, is included in the model. Because high-skilled individuals expect increases
in their income owing to increases in the prices of skill-intensive products, a candidate who
runs for election in constituencies with high shares of high-skilled individuals is anticipated
to tend to support trade liberalization and TPP participation. As proxies for the share
of high-skilled individuals, I employ the share of people with bachelors degrees (skill) and
average income (income) in the constituency; both variables are expected to be negatively
correlated with protectionism.
Second, a variable based on ideas from political economy is considered. As presented
by HotellingDowns median voter theorem, ideological positions converge at the median
voters preference when there are two candidates. However, the conclusion is di¤erent when
the number of candidates is more than two. Cox (1987, 1990) shows that the ideological
position of each candidate is scattered as the number of candidates in a constituency increases
because a candidate realizes the chance of winning with few number of votes and attempts
to di¤erentiate his/her political stance from those of competitors for securing votes from a
specic group. To control the possible di¤erences in trade policy preferences due to di¤erences
in the number of candidates, the Cox threshold (Cox), dened as the total number of votes
over the number of candidates, is added into the empirical model.14
13In Japan, the average MFN applied tari¤ rate for agricultural products is 19%, whereas that for nona-
gricultural products is 2.6%, according to the World Tari¤ Prole 2014.
14Based on this prediction, Park and Jensen (2007) examine the relation between the Cox threshold and
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Candidates who face a narrow constituency are anticipated to tend to favor protectionist
trade policies, and thus, the negative sign of the Cox threshold is predicted. In addition,
population density (density) is added into the model because it is believed that candidates
running from city districts are likely to be advocates of trade liberalization area. Table 2
displays the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of candidates running for the election
and their constituenciescharacteristics.15
<Table 2 around here>
4. Empirical results
4.1. Baseline results
Before presenting the estimation results of bivariate probit with an endogenous variable,
Table 3 displays the basic results estimated by the standard bivariate probit model for the
choice of whether trade liberalization or the protection of domestic industries is agreeable
and whether Japans participation in TPP is agreeable. The gures show the estimated coef-
cients and robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level in brackets to account
for the correlation between candidates within a constituency. The possible endogeneity bias
associated with the simultaneous decision of the two choices is considered in this model. The
correlation between the error terms, as expressed by rho, is statistically signicant at the
1% level, which suggests that the two decisions are positively correlated with each other and
support the application of the bivariate model.
agricultural subsidies using cross-country and commodity-level data and report a negative correlation between
the two variables.
15Although one may be concerned about multicollinearity, a correlation matrix among the explanatory
variables does not show signicantly high correlation coe¢ cients.
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<Table 3 around here>
The key variable here is victory margin over the second-placed candidate or loss margin
over the rst-placed candidate as a proxy variable for electoral competition. To examine
the consistency of the results, the model in column [1] includes victory or loss margin and
candidates characteristics, whereas column [2] shows the results for the complete set of
covariates, including constituency characteristics, and the square term of margin is added
to the model in column [3]. The statistical signicance of the margin does not change
among these models. The margin of victory or loss is statistically signicant and negatively
associated with the probability of supporting the protectionist trade policy, as predicted. At
the same time, the coe¢ cient of the squared term is signicantly positive and indicates that
there is a negative quadratic relation, with a turning victory margin of 3.5. This relation is
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 indicates that the likelihood of supporting both the
protection of domestic industries and nonparticipation in the TPP decreases as the margin
of victory increases, but the probability becomes increasingly less likely to respond, leading
up to a victory margin of 3.5, and condence intervals tend to diverge from the tting line.
Conversely, Figure 2 shows that the likelihood of supporting trade liberalization and TPP
participation increases as the margin of victory increases, whereas it is saturated when the
victory margin approaches the value of 3.5 and condence intervals diverge as the margin
increases. Given these results with respect to the proxy for electoral pressures, candidates
who won the election by narrow margins are suggested to more likely favor protectionist trade
policies than those who won by substantial majorities.
<Figures 1 and 2 around here>
16
4.2. Results from structural model
The victory margin and loss are suspected to be endogenous because they are based on the
number of votes gained in the election. To deal with the endogeneity issue, in this study,
an instrumental variable approach is considered by introducing a dummy variable indicating
hereditary candidates as an instrument. Table 4 presents the results of the structural model
for Eqs. (3)(5). As shown in columns of Margin, the hereditary candidate dummy is
signicantly and positively correlated with the victory margin, which is as expected. After
controlling endogeneity bias, the victory margin and loss remain signicant and negative.
In addition, the statistical signicance of explanatory variables does not change from those
shown in Table 3. Table 5 shows the computed marginal e¤ects at the mean level on the
probability divided into the four options. For an average candidate, one unit increase in
the margin of victory decreases the probability of supporting protectionist trade policy and
nonparticipation in the TPP by 15% but increases the probability of supporting free trade
policy and TPP participation by 10%.
<Tables 4 and 5 around here>
Among candidatescharacteristics, only the variables age, inuence, organized, and sen-
timent show statistically signicant coe¢ cients and raise the probability of favoring the
protectionist trade policies, whereas there is no correlation between the experience of repre-
sentatives and protectionism. Although previous studies on determinants of individualstrade
policy preferences consistently show that females are more likely to prefer import restrictions
than males,16 politicians gender does not seem to a¤ect their trade policy preferences. Ad-
16See Mayda and Rodrik (2005), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Blonigen (2011), and Ito et al. (2015).
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vocates of protectionism can be found among older candidates. Because younger candidates
are likely to appeal for structural reform, this result is natural. As expected, the result of
inuence indicates that a candidate with experience in agricultural policy is likely to support
protectionism. In addition, candidates who appeal groups or organizations from which many
votes can be expected in election campaigns tend to support the protectionist trade policies.
Anti-U.S. sentiment among politicians seems to be a barrier to trade liberalization. This
result implies that trade liberalization and TPP participation are considered to be a market
opening to the U.S.
Examining how the constituency-level attributes are related with politicians trade policy
preferences from the viewpoint of trade theory predictions is interesting. Concerning the
industrial composition of constituencies and as for the choice of TPP participation, there is
a positive correlation between the agricultural workers ratio (agri) and opposition to TPP
participation. In addition, there is a negative correlation between the manufacturing workers
ratio and support for TPP participation, as expected. This result suggests that candidates
judgment about whether TPP participation is right is sensitive to changes in the industrial
composition in constituencies. However, this tendency is not observed for the choice of gen-
eral preferences of trade liberalization. Instead, the coe¢ cient of the skill variable is negative
and signicant, as predicted; this implies that the probability of supporting protection is
low in a constituency with a high concentration of skilled individuals. This result is consis-
tent with the StolperSamuelson theorem, which assumes that workers are perfectly mobile
across industries and predicts that skilled workers benet from income increases after trade
liberalization in a skill-abundant country. These results are consistent with ndings by pre-
vious studies (Kaempfer and Marks, 1993; Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Beaulieu, 2002). The
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di¤erent responses in terms of agri and skill probably depend on a di¤erence in the sensi-
tivity of voters. A specic trade agreement such as the TPP seems to be a more sensitive
political issue for the agricultural sector in each constituency than the general view on trade
liberalization. On the other hand, an advocate of free trade is more likely to be found in
constituencies with high education levels.
Narrow constituencies are expected to induce candidates to appeal to a specic group from
which a certain number of votes can be expected. However, contrary to the expectations, the
Cox threshold shows signicant and positive sign. Generally, an urban area constituency has
more number of candidates than a rural area constituency. Although the population density
and the share of agricultural workers are controlled, such counter-intuitive result could be
partly because of the di¤erence between the number of candidates in urban and rural areas.
Alternatively, this result may be because candidates tend to display policy di¤erentiation in
constituencies with many candidates.
For a robustness check, I excluded losers in the election from the entire sample. The
estimation results remain almost the same even when the data is restricted to only winners,
as shown in Table 6. Turning to the main variable of interest, the results of the victory
margin from the restricted sample are consistent with those from the entire sample, although
the statistical signicance appears to be weak at the 10% level for the choice of whether to
support trade liberalization. From these results, even if the sample is restricted to winners
in the election, the candidates who won by a narrow margin of votes tend to be advocates of
protectionism compared with those who won with a large majority.
<Table 6 around here>
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5. Conclusions
Implementing free trade policies is a politically di¢ cult issue, but very few researchers have
attempted to empirically examine the type of political pressure that a¤ects politiciansviews
on trade policy. An exception is Conconi et al. (2014) who focus on the role of electoral
cycle in a¤ecting voting behavior of the U.S. Congress on trade liberalization bills. The
present study explores the e¤ect of electoral competition among politicians on their trade
policy preferences using candidate-level data of the general election for the members of the
House of Representatives in Japan.
Considering the potential endogeneity bias in electoral strength, this study adopts an
instrumental variable approach employing the hereditary characteristic of candidates as the
instrumental variable. The results indicate that politicianspreferences for trade policy are
sensitive to electoral pressures. Losers and winners who run a close race in an election
are more likely to advocate protectionism compared with winners by huge majorities. This
tendency is observed even among election winners and even after controlling the endogeneity
bias. Note that there is a possibility that electoral pressures deter politicians from supporting
free trade policy.
This result partly explains why politicians tend to support protectionist trade policy, even
though a majority of the nationals support further trade liberalization. Although politicians
are better informed regarding the benets of trade liberalization than the nationals, the
results of this study suggest that electoral pressures makes them hesitant toward supporting
free trade policy. The low voter turnout in general elections may amplify the e¤ect of electoral
pressures on the likelihood of supporting protectionism because the majorities who support
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free trade policy are not interested in elections and are less likely to vote to achieve trade
liberalization, whereas the median voter is likely to vote according to interests on factor
endowments.17
One of the limitations of this study is the nature of the data. Because candidatestrade
policy preferences were surveyed during the election campaign, they may be partial to pro-
tectionism. In addition, the question of whether they really vote against trade liberalization
bills still needs to be examined. A winning candidate who previously opposed Japans partic-
ipation in the TPP may change his/her opinion and vote in favor of the bill in the parliament
based on the principle of one party for one person. In Japanese parliament, where this
principle is dominant, there may be no variations in the voting behavior of members be-
longing to the same party. Nevertheless, if a winner elected with a narrow margin persists
on protectionism even when voting for trade policy bills, the evidence of electoral pressures
would be quite conclusive.
17Public elections in Japan are not compulsory voting. The voter turnout in the election is 59.32%, and
the most recent one in 2014 election is 52.66%; these values are lower than those of the U.S. (67.95%) and
UK (65.77%) and close to those of France (55.4%).
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Table 1: Distribution of trade policy preferences
Pro-TPP Not sure Anti-TPP Total
Free trade 255 (20.9%) 39 (3.2%) 50 (4.1%) 344 (28.2%)
Not sure 75 (6.2%) 96 (7.9%) 116 (9.5%) 287 (23.6%)
Protectionist 38 (3.1%) 49 (4.0%) 500 (41.1%) 587 (48.2%)
Total 368 (30.2%) 184 (15.1%) 666 (54.7%) 1,218 (100.0%)
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Protectionist: Include "not sure" 1218 0.718 0.450 0 1
Protectionist: Exclude "not sure" 931 0.631 0.483 0 1
Anti-TPP: Include "not sure" 1218 0.698 0.459 0 1
Anti-TPP: Exclude "not sure" 1034 0.644 0.479 0 1
Margin: Margin of vote over 1st- or 2nd-placed 1218 0.694 0.738 0.007 7.108
Gender: Female=1 1218 0.146 0.353 0 1
Age: Candidates age 1218 50.164 11.107 25 94
Term: N of experienced terms 1218 1.213 2.143 0 14
Newcomer: Newcomers in the election=1 1218 0.610 0.488 0 1
Experienced: Experienced candidates=1 1218 0.030 0.169 0 1
Former: Former member=1 1218 0.052 0.222 0 1
Incumbent: Incumbent member=1 1218 0.309 0.462 0 1
Inuence: Specialized in agricultural policy=1 1218 0.167 0.374 0 1
Organized: Organized election campaign=1 1218 0.432 0.496 0 1
Sentiment: Ant-U.S. sentiment=1 1218 0.043 0.202 0 1
Agri: Agricultural workers share (%) 1218 3.651 3.795 0.040 19.256
Manuf: Manufaturing workers share (%) 1218 15.908 6.675 4.156 39.109
Skill: Share of individuals having a bachelor degree 1218 13.806 5.001 4.920 27.150
Income: Average annual income (million JPY) 1218 3.159 0.661 0 6.687
Density: Population density (1000persons/km2) 1218 3.261 4.429 0.026 19.812
Cox: Cox threshold (total votes/N of candidates) 1218 46.027 10.582 21.752 120.401
Hereditary: Hereditary candidates=1 1218 0.365 0.481 0 1
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Table 3: Baseline results from bivariate probit
[1] [2] [3]
Protectionist Anti-TPP Protectionist Anti-TPP Protectionist Anti-TPP
Margin -0.360*** -0.453*** -0.384*** -0.516*** -0.971*** -0.964***
[0.102] [0.109] [0.104] [0.115] [0.239] [0.265]
Margin-sq 0.146** 0.114*
[0.0569] [0.0687]
Gender 0.146 0.123 0.154 0.162 0.132 0.147
[0.134] [0.137] [0.137] [0.140] [0.137] [0.140]
Age 0.0190*** 0.0211*** 0.0176*** 0.0193*** 0.0165*** 0.0185***
[0.00429] [0.00444] [0.00431] [0.00455] [0.00436] [0.00459]
Terms -0.0284 -0.0212 -0.0295 -0.0224 -0.0165 -0.0132
[0.0324] [0.0295] [0.0334] [0.0332] [0.0339] [0.0333]
Expe -0.0513 0.155 0.0887 0.412 0.106 0.429
[0.301] [0.307] [0.292] [0.310] [0.291] [0.309]
Former 0.0435 -0.297 0.145 -0.117 0.21 -0.061
[0.226] [0.250] [0.224] [0.246] [0.228] [0.246]
Incumb -0.0508 0.282 -0.0506 0.383** 0.00627 0.431**
[0.172] [0.176] [0.177] [0.183] [0.181] [0.187]
Inuence 0.940*** 1.105*** 0.779*** 0.715*** 0.773*** 0.714***
[0.159] [0.176] [0.172] [0.195] [0.170] [0.196]
Organized 0.284*** 0.326*** 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.236*** 0.238***
[0.0902] [0.0894] [0.0910] [0.0915] [0.0907] [0.0914]
Sentiment 0.687** 1.380*** 0.693* 1.510*** 0.667* 1.492***
[0.329] [0.368] [0.354] [0.387] [0.351] [0.385]
Agri -0.0107 0.0891*** -0.0112 0.0893***
[0.0156] [0.0195] [0.0156] [0.0197]
Manuf -0.00728 -0.0108 -0.00621 -0.0102
[0.00698] [0.00687] [0.00701] [0.00693]
Skill -0.0420*** 0.000684 -0.0398*** 0.00277
[0.0142] [0.0138] [0.0141] [0.0138]
Income -0.0477 -0.0925 -0.0416 -0.0892
[0.0648] [0.0593] [0.0625] [0.0587]
Density -0.00274 -0.0290** -0.00377 -0.0298***
[0.0120] [0.0113] [0.0121] [0.0115]
Cox 0.0104*** 0.00912** 0.0102*** 0.00891**
[0.00353] [0.00355] [0.00363] [0.00370]
Party dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.292 0.763** 0.844** 0.909** 1.270*** 1.224**
[0.285] [0.304] [0.409] [0.450] [0.431] [0.477]
Rho 0.962*** 1.005*** 0.998***
[0.0729] [0.0789] [0.0789]
Observations 1,218 1,218 1,218
ll -971 -930 -925
df_m 30 42 44
chi2 560 664 659
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust
standard errors clustered within a constituency are in brackets.
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Table 4: Results of bivariate probit with endogenous variable
[1] [2]
Protectionist Anti-TPP Margin Protectionist Anti-TPP Margin
Margin -0.357*** -0.504*** -0.384*** -0.516***
[0.103] [0.108] [0.104] [0.115]
Gender 0.146 0.0842 -0.0658*** 0.155 0.107 -0.0627***
[0.134] [0.136] [0.0218] [0.136] [0.136] [0.0213]
Age 0.0191*** 0.0226*** -0.00437*** 0.0179*** 0.0206*** -0.00424***
[0.00423] [0.00435] [0.000995] [0.00426] [0.00452] [0.000974]
Terms -0.0309 -0.00965 0.0716*** -0.0337 -0.00063 0.0721***
[0.0328] [0.0331] [0.0155] [0.0337] [0.0366] [0.0154]
Expe -0.0246 0.327 -0.103** 0.12 0.542 -0.107**
[0.304] [0.382] [0.0476] [0.298] [0.388] [0.0490]
Former 0.069 -0.34 -0.0444 0.18 -0.166 -0.04
[0.237] [0.265] [0.0858] [0.236] [0.259] [0.0873]
Incumb -0.055 0.306 0.321*** -0.0438 0.364* 0.313***
[0.176] [0.191] [0.0571] [0.179] [0.198] [0.0562]
Inuence 0.937*** 1.091*** 0.0709 0.775*** 0.709*** 0.0707
[0.159] [0.181] [0.0453] [0.172] [0.194] [0.0433]
Organized 0.278*** 0.326*** 0.00303 0.245*** 0.256*** 0.00608
[0.0902] [0.0914] [0.0237] [0.0913] [0.0937] [0.0239]
Sentiment 0.711** 1.584*** -0.0418** 0.724** 1.800*** -0.0471**
[0.321] [0.461] [0.0212] [0.347] [0.503] [0.0227]
Agri -0.00909 0.0853*** 0.00532
[0.0157] [0.0192] [0.00512]
Manuf -0.00688 -0.0104 0.000269
[0.00703] [0.00708] [0.00144]
Skill -0.0414*** 0.000716 0.00441*
[0.0141] [0.0149] [0.00266]
Income -0.051 -0.126* -0.0180*
[0.0661] [0.0689] [0.0107]
Density -0.00184 -0.0261** 0.00219
[0.0122] [0.0114] [0.00263]




Party dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.297 0.819*** 1.551*** 0.856** 0.972** 1.360***
[0.286] [0.307] [0.0625] [0.410] [0.450] [0.0965]
Observations 1,218 1,218
ll -1,695 -1,646
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors clustered within a constituency are in brackets.
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Table 5: Marginal e¤ects of covariates
Pr(1, 1) Pr(0, 1) Pr(1, 0) Pr(0, 0 )
Margin -0.1572 0.0153 0.0398 0.1020
(0.0332) (0.0195) (0.0149) (0.0213)
Gender 0.0564 -0.0117 -0.0093 -0.0353
(0.0422) (0.0259) (0.0191) (0.0263)
Age 0.0065 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0041
(0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Terms -0.0095 0.0033 0.0005 0.0057
(0.0102) (0.0063) (0.0046) (0.0063)
Experienced 0.0802 0.0332 -0.0531 -0.0603
(0.0933) (0.0532) (0.0407) (0.0583)
Former 0.0126 -0.0448 0.0316 0.0006
(0.0665) (0.0488) (0.0376) (0.0424)
Incumbent 0.0468 0.0586 -0.0623 -0.0431
(0.0546) (0.0347) (0.0257) (0.0340)
Inuence 0.2692 -0.0727 -0.0311 -0.1654
(0.0545) (0.0329) (0.0264) (0.0347)
Organized 0.0891 -0.0206 -0.0131 -0.0554
(0.0278) (0.0176) (0.0130) (0.0174)
Sentiment 0.3704 0.0449 -0.1584 -0.2568
(0.1196) (0.0563) (0.0438) (0.0744)
Agri 0.0111 0.0134 -0.0144 -0.0101
(0.0052) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0035)
Manuf -0.0031 0.0002 0.0009 0.0021
(0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0013)
Skill -0.0086 0.0088 -0.0042 0.0040
(0.0043) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0027)
Income -0.0238 -0.0017 0.0092 0.0163
(0.0197) (0.0114) (0.0077) (0.0121)
Density -0.0049 -0.0031 0.0041 0.0039
(0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0022)
Cox 0.0035 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0022
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Notes: Pr(Protectionist=0/1, Anti-TPP=0/1 ). Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6: Results from the restricted sample to winners
[1]All winners [2]Winners in a single seat
Protectionist Anti-TPP Margin Protectionist Anti-TPP Margin
Victory margin -0.187 -0.539*** -0.231* -0.377**
[0.117] [0.126] [0.133] [0.158]
Gender 0.0851 -0.223 -0.163 0.33 -0.684 0.0769
[0.296] [0.468] [0.149] [0.368] [0.447] [0.236]
Age 0.0144 0.0313** -0.0139** 0.0168 0.0439** -0.0175**
[0.00924] [0.0131] [0.00570] [0.0118] [0.0182] [0.00777]
Terms -0.0308 0.0392 0.0485** -0.0557 -0.0406 0.0247
[0.0480] [0.0656] [0.0242] [0.0546] [0.0841] [0.0327]
Experienced -0.416 0.434 -0.0253 -0.304 0.729 0.0551
[0.411] [0.492] [0.136] [0.446] [0.618] [0.184]
Former 0.0968 -0.488 0.17 0.0895 -0.681* 0.271**
[0.277] [0.328] [0.112] [0.319] [0.409] [0.137]
Incumbent -0.184 0.0841 0.757*** -0.135 -0.0221 0.883***
[0.296] [0.394] [0.168] [0.360] [0.609] [0.218]
Inuence 0.678** 0.698 0.038 0.497 0.569 -0.0522
[0.292] [0.426] [0.118] [0.344] [0.612] [0.142]
Organized 0.337** 0.104 -0.0362 0.278 0.12 -0.0446
[0.160] [0.206] [0.0736] [0.192] [0.247] [0.0917]
Sentiment 3.770*** 2.943*** -0.459***
[0.298] [0.336] [0.104]
Agri -0.021 0.0995** -0.00308 -0.00334 0.175* 0.00734
[0.0288] [0.0434] [0.0150] [0.0400] [0.0928] [0.0202]
Manuf -0.00994 -0.0112 -0.00374 -0.0201 7.86E-05 -0.00114
[0.0122] [0.0150] [0.00552] [0.0168] [0.0262] [0.00710]
Skill -0.0376 0.0271 -0.0224** -0.0252 0.0602 -0.0233
[0.0242] [0.0323] [0.0108] [0.0373] [0.0438] [0.0164]
Income -0.0214 -0.079 -0.0244 -0.215 -0.244 -0.106
[0.114] [0.102] [0.0446] [0.246] [0.177] [0.0664]
Density -0.0694*** -0.115*** 0.0160* -0.0824*** -0.154*** 0.0169
[0.0226] [0.0296] [0.00950] [0.0293] [0.0408] [0.0104]
Cox 0.000372 -0.0115 0.00726** 0.00385 -0.0101 0.00923**
[0.00665] [0.00778] [0.00347] [0.00827] [0.0107] [0.00407]
Hereditary 0.288** 0.218*
[0.116] [0.130]
Party dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.368* 1.645 2.077*** 1.873* 0.847 2.488***
[0.705] [1.070] [0.420] [1.052] [1.602] [0.596]
Observations 425 425 425 300 300 300
ll -749 -749 -749 -511.8 -511.8 -511.8
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors clustered within a constituency are in brackets. Column [1] presents
the results for winners in the election including candidates who failed to win in a single-
seat constituency, but won a seat in a proportionally represented constituency. Column [2]
shows the results for only winners in a single-seat constituency. Sentiment is omitted due to
collinearity. 29
